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Modern society is a n  organizational society. From birth in hospitals, to education in 
schools, to work in corporations, to burial, we exist in the shadow of complex organizations. At 
one time, the key organizational forms were family, community and occupation; now complex 
organizations are a defining attribute of modern society, with a wide range and variety of 
organizations and organizational arrangements. 
Academic disciplines have responded to this transformation of society. The study of 
organizations, their connection to society, their impact on individuals, and their internal structure 
and process have become important topics. Although the study of bureaucracies, administration, 
and management can be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century, one of the-most exciting 
developments in the social sciences in the last thirty years has been the growth and mushrooming 
of theory'and research on organizations. This growth is much more than just a quantitative 
expansion. New theoretical perspectives have generated large research programs; new journals 
have been started; exciting debate about and deepening insight into organizations has occurred. 
For instance, population-ecology models of organization (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) have 
generated predictions and research on the survival of organizational forms under different 
environmental conditions. For another example, the "institutional" school of John Meyer and his 
collaborators (Meyer and Scott, 1983) has broken from the instrumentalist base of much early 
organizational theory. In the process we have learned' a great deal about how the structure, 
personnel and norms of organizations are dependent upon societal processes that  have little to do 
with economizing and production necessities. 
The ferment in organizational theory and research extends well beyond sociology proper. 
In economics, the theory of the firm has developed a structure and a body. Principal-agent theory 
(Fama and Jensen; 1983), transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975, 1985) and other approaches 
have allowed economists to tackle topics that  were ignored or assumed away in earlier periods. 
The choice of organizational form, the tradeoffs among hierarchies, markets, and long term 
contracts are subject to analytic and empirical examination. 
Decision theory has been enriched by loosening the time horizon and seeing decisions as  
part  of a stream of decisions, retrospective reconstructions, shifting coalitions and the like. (See 
the various publications of J. G. March and his collaborators, for instance Harrison and March, 
1986.) 
Although this has been a period of real ferment and intensification in our understanding of 
organizations, most of the newer approaches do not explain the transformation of organizations in 
an  historical context. The great transformation to an  organizational society may be described by 
historians (see Chandler, 1962, 1977) but sociological, psychological and economic theories of 
organization and management proceed without reference to historical context and process. These 
newer approaches continue the nomothetic, a-historical cast  of organizational theory and, for that  
matter, most of social science. Models are developed and propositions are stated as if they apply 
to all organizations in all societies, over. an  indefinite time span. Even if some gross distinctiors 
are employed, such as  public sector organizations, firms, or non-profit organizations, these 
categories are employed as if they have a timeless meaning. No historical characterization is 
given. The fact that  the corporation as  a legally bound institution is much different today than i t  
was a century ago is ignored. Nor is there any attempt to place the analysis of organizations and 
their environmental dependencies in a historical and comparative socio-economic framework. 
Although there has been a growth of comparative studies of organizations, these are usually done 
in a static, synchronic framework (see Lammers and Hickson, 1979). 
Now, if organizations were timeless entities whose structures and operations extended over 
long periods and across many societies, a n  exclusively nomothetic approach might be quite 
appropriate. Abstract models of organizational structure, coordination and control, or of 
organization-environment relations could be developed and applied to organizations of various 
concatenations of variables. In  fact, we know that  most of the phenomena which are analyzed in 
organizational theory are very time dependent. On the historical record, they represent a blip. 
The modern corporation, with its extreme separation of management and ownership and 
divisional decentralization, came into existence in the first third of this century, spread in the 
developed par t  of the capitalist world in the second third (especially after WWII), and may vanish 
by ? It is a profoundly historical phenomenon. Yet our theoretical discussion of the 
corporation tends to downplay that  historicity. How it developed is treated a s  a functionally 
necessary and efficient outcome of organizational complexity under competitive conditions (cf. 
Chandler, 1962, 1977; Williamson, 1985). I believe the explanation is more complicated than that 
and requires a more complex and historically contingent analysis (see below). 
If we ask how historical and comparative analysis might change our views, we would 
quickly note that  a t  the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century other nations 
legitimized cartels and bank linkages in a way that  differed from the United States. Cartels were 
legally encouraged in Germany, and banks were part  of trading groups in Japan. Thus, the forms 
of competition and cooperation and of investment linkages were different in these countries. 
Similarly, public agencies today differ greatly from public agencies of the nineteenth or eighteenth 
century; yet our synchronic approach to public administration has no account of the differences. It 
has no account of how we got from there to here, except a straight narrative account. 
I believe--it is an  article of faith, that  nesting organizational theory in historical process 
and development will have many salutary effects. We will see organizational structures and 
processes a s  contingent on a more subtle set of societal processes which are often ignored in 
current theorizing. We will have a better sense of the extent to which organizational forms are 
embedded in legal and cultural systems and relationships. Our abstract models will be seen as  
applying within particular socio-economic constraints, rather than as timeless universals. Our 
models will be more, not less, powerful, because we will be able to specify the conditions under 
which they hold. 
Moreover, an  historically nested, comparative approach to organizations should aid in 
policy application and formulation. Too often the public debate over organizational policy matters 
proceeds from abstract theory or ideology, with little attention to the experience of other nations or 
of historical options and choices--whether we are  discussing tax policy, anti-trust issues or 
takeover policy. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, historical and comparative 
analysis ought to be an aid to institutional choice. (We return to this topic in the conclusion.) 
It is one thing to assert the value of a historical nesting of organizational theory; it is 
quite another to demonstrate that  value. This paper represents a programmatic effort rather 
than a demonstration - of the power of historical nesting. First, I will be more precise about the 
defining characteristics of organizations and how alternative classifications of organizations are 
tied to historical issues. The body of the paper will discuss several historical trends and abstract 
characterizations that  can be examined profitably by interlacing history and sociology. By and 
large the focus will be on societal determinants of corporate and business structure and internal 
processes; that  is, corporations and organizational components are the dependent variable. We 
will have less to say  about the impact of organizations on individual lives or on society. The 
analysis examines components of corporations such a s  management contrc! structure, the 
organization of labor on the shop floor and the legal status of corporations. Our strategy is to 
historicize standard components of organizations discussed in organizational theory. Rather than 
treat them as givens or as sole alternatives, the issue is what were the societal and historical 
alternatives? 
Organizational Types, Components and History 
What do we mean by the term "complex" or "formal" organization? How are  complex 
organizations different from other kinds of social organizations (e.g., small groups, kin groups, 
societies, nations)? After presenting alternative definitions, W. Richard Scott states: 
Organizations are  collectivities oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific 
goals. They are "purposeful" in the sense that  the activities and interactions of 
participants are centrally coordinated to achieve specified goals. Goals are specific 
to the extent that  they are explicit, are clearly defined, and provide unambiguous 
criteria for selecting among alternative activities. 
Organizations are  collectivities that exhibit a relatively high degree of 
formalization. The cooperation among participants is "conscious" and "deliberate"; 
the structure of relations is made explicit and can be "deliberately constructed and 
The methodological approach to combining history and theory used in this paper is only 
one of many that  might be adopted. See the appendix for a discussion of several alternatives. 
reconstructed." As previously defined, a structure is formalized to the extent that  
the rules governing behavior are precisely and explicitly formulated and to the 
extent that  roles i d  role relations are p;escribed-independently of the personal 
attributes of individuals occupying positions in the structure (1987, p.21). 
Organizations have relatively specific goals; they harness people together to accomplish 
those goals .through incentives of various kinds; they develop authority structures, rules and a 
division of labor that  serve to coordinate and guide the actions of the members. Since 
organizations have relatively specific goals, they depend upon the larger society for the provision 
of resources and legitimation to function. They are more delimited than societies and exist, are 
constrained, and are shaped by the political demands of the larger political system. 
I t  is possible to discuss the transformation of organizations over time as a kind of general 
process. Thus, one might argue that  organizations have become larger over the last several 
centuries; a t  least there are more large organizations now than there were a t  the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Similarly,. more organizations employ wage labor for the production of goods, 
instead of contracting out or using family members or slaves (a change in the incentive and 
authority basis of organizations). Yet other kinds of organizations, for example, social movement 
organizations and traditional churches, are not necessarily that  much larger than a t  earlier times. 
And although they may employ some wage labor and be more bureaucratized than a t  earlier 
times, they still attract members on the basis of solidary and purposive incentives (Wilson and 
Clark, 1963; McCarthy and Zald, 1973). At the same time, the marriage of evangelical religion to 
the emerging technologies of satellite transmission and cable television has radically expanded the 
scope of some denominations and transformed the bases of religious participation for some parts of 
the population. Because different kinds of organizations have different historical and .societal 
contexts, I think i t  is more useful to restrict our focus to particular types of organizations or to 
core aspects of organizations, rather than discussing the historical basis of the transformation of 
all organizations, combining historical context and general theory to arrive a t  overarching 
interpretations of organizations and society. 
There is no agreement on a category or classification scheme for organizations comparable 
to those found in biology or zoology. (On the problems of constructing classification systems of 
.organizations see McKelvey, 1982.) Instead, scholars accept the common language terms, often 
generated out of enterprise form (defined in law by legal ownership), purpose (broad or narrowly 
. conceived), and incentive basis. Organizations distinguished by enterpise form are sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, corporations, not-for-profit corporations, public corporations, and 
public agencies. Each type has a different standing in law, packages control and authority in 
different ways, has different relations to the state and to capital markets and has different 
historical and societal incidence. 
Organizations can be classified by broad purpose, such as social movement organizations- 
organizations attempting to change society, businesses--organizations aimed a t  making profits by 
selling products or services, religious organizations--organizations concerned with human's relation 
to the ultimate grounds of being. More narrow categorizations of purpose may also be developed-- 
e.g., manufacturing versus service businesses, or even more narrowly, steel manufacturing, 
personal services. 
Finally, organizations can be classified by incentive system--coercive, material, purposive, 
or solidary (Clark and Wilson, 1961; Etzioni, 1975; Zald and Jacobs, 1978). Coercive 
organizations achieve their ends through use of punishment and deprivation of liberty. Material 
organizations offer their members money and goods for participating in the organization. 
Purposive incentives offer the opportunity to achieve normative ends. Solidary organizations offer 
pleasing social relations and a sense of belonging. 
Obviously, there are other bases for distinguishing among organizations, usually relating 
to some specific aspect of their functioning--technological development or kind of technological 
throughput, type of labor process, organizational structure (centralized or decentralized), etcetera. 
Usually it makes more sense to discuss the transformation of structural aspects of organizations 
within a particular type (e.g., distinguished by enterprise form, purpose, or incentive system) than 
to discuss the transformation of structural arrangements in general. Some types of organizations 
will not face dilemmas of centralization or decentralization; some types of organizations do not 
have a transformation of wage labor. 
While many kinds of organizations may share similar historical trajectories, it is more 
likely that  they will have different historical and spatial careers. Phrased differently, there is no 
apriori reason to expect strong time and societal dependence for all types of organizations and 
their components. Different industries emerge a t  different points in time; societies encourage or 
discourage particular types of organizations and enterprises. Which aspect or type should be 
examined in detail is a function of investigator taste and the amount of leverage to be gained for a 
broader understanding of organizations and society. I n  this paper the focus will be upon a central 
organizational type of modern society--the business corporation, and the transformation of several 
of its key components. 
The Making of the Capitalist Corporation 
There are many ways in which the conjoining of history, sociology and the study of 
particular processes or types of organizations could proceed. I will focus on the development of the 
modern corporation and its components. Clearly, the corporation is a central part  of the modern 
econo'my, a power holder in its own right, and an important actor in the polity of all capitalistic 
nations. My purpose is to suggest some of the questions that  are  raised a s  the study of the 
history of corporations is opened up to sociological analysis, and as we use history to challenge 
sociological formulations. 
The issues raised range from micro (really meso) to macro. They also vary in their locus-- 
problems internal to the firm, i.e., management control systems; and the evolution of employee 
and labor relations; the transformation of inter-organizational relationsand networks; problems in 
the legal definition of organizations, and problems in the relation of the state to organizations. 
Each of these topics has received substantial treatment in the literature on organizations. They 
vary in the extent to which they have been given historical treatment, but all can benefit by 
nesting general propositions in historical and societal context. Although I will not treat each of 
these topics in equal detail, I will attempt to indicate the sociological and historical complexities of 
each of the routes chosen. I begin by focusing on the transformation of the internal management 
and control of business enterprises. 
Management Control Systems. One of the great transformations of organizations over the 
last one hundred and fifty years has been the development of management hierarchies and control 
systems. Size and complexity drove a wedge between owners and producing workers. As owners 
or their first order delegates became more and more distant, as supervisors supervised supervisors 
supervising supervisors, problems of control loss became endemic to organizations. Control loss is 
accompanied by deflection from organizational aims and from economizing in the owners' interest, 
or so the theory goes (Williamson, 1964). As organizations become larger and more differentiated 
(as measured by the number of occupations, products, and specialized functions) they become more 
bureaucratic, developing formal structures and standardized procedures. The general correlation 
between size, complexity and structure and procedure holdsin all modern societies, representing a 
well established nomothetic proposition. (See Hickson, et  al., in Lammers and Hickson, 1979). 
Yet there are national and historical differences in how corporations met. the challenge of control 
loss. 
Alfred Dupont Chandler's (1977) The Visible Hand is devoted to a discussion of the growth 
of managerial hierarchies and control systems in the period of their great emergence in the United 
States around the turn of the century. (The multiple divisional form emerges later.) One major 
component of the control system that develops is the growth of managerial accounting systems. 
(As contrasted with public or financial accounting, managerial accounting is aimed a t  internal 
control and decision making.) Taken together, internal budgeting systems and cost accounting 
systems are powerful mechanisms for delegating responsibility, for reviewing the results of that 
delegation, and for developing standards for economizing judgements by management. Cost 
accounting information is especially critical for economizing decisions because it develops refined 
categories of unit costs and allows the manager to compare alternative mixes of fixed and variable 
costs and labor and capital investments in arriving a t  production decisions. 
Accounting information and accounting systems are not costless themselves. They require 
specialized personnel and the devotion of time by both specialized and general personnel to the 
collection of data, their recording and analysis, and to report transmission. We have little sense 
of accounting costs for different organizations in different industries a t  different times. If 
accounting information was the sine qua non, the only route to effective internal control and 
decision making, one might just assume it as  a prerequisite of organizational effectiveness. I t  is 
not the only route, however. 
Both theoretically and empirically there is a t  least some reason to see cost-accounting 
techniques and cost-accounting personnel as  socially nested developments. On the theoretical side, 
there are alternative ways of minimizing control loss. Socialization, carefully crafted incentive 
systems, and clan-like relations (Ouchi, 1978, 1979, 1980) may tie supervisors and workers to the 
aims of principals (Williamson, 1985) obviating the necessity of continual supervision and 
surveillance, to some extent. Moreover, once the costs of information are taken into account, the 
value of standard operating procedures (SOP), derived from rules of thumb, for making decisions, 
as contrasted with more refined cost calculations, remains an alternative. Of course, cost- 
accounting systems do not emerge overnight, but are historical accretions, in separate 
organizations, in industries, and in societal management systems. Thus, the costs of developing 
cost accounting systems decline because of historical learning curves. 
On the empirical side, there is some evidence to indicate that managerial hierarchies vary 
in size and scope across national boundaries. (See Lincoln, Hanada, and ~ c ~ r i d e ,  1986; Azumi, 
et al., 1984.) They may also employ detailed accounting systems to a lesser degree. John Meyer 
(1986) has argued that the processes of rationalization has taken different form in Germany, a 
more "corporatist" society, than in liberal Western societies. As a consequence, he argues that 
German managers have had less reliance on accounting and accounting information. Piore and 
Sabel (1985) argue that craft based organization of the shop floor is an alternative to mass- 
production organization for many industries. Further, they argue that German industry retained 
a craft-based plant community in many industries that had become mass-production based in the 
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United States. They put forward the general supposition that both scientific management and 
cost accounting are more likely to be institutionalized in mass-production organized industries. 
Taking both of these points together, several research questions are suggested: 
--What was the size and distribution of accounting personnel and accounting effort internal 
to firms and industries over time? Marshall Meyer has described the correlates of growth of 
municipal finance offices (1985), but I am unaware of parallel studies in private firms. Typical 
business histories are more likely to report on the introduction of standardized accounting practice 
than they are on the costs or organization of accounting practice. 
--How does accounting practice differ in the same industries in different countries? 
Industry is a key control variable, since industries differ in size of firm, in the introduction of 
management, and in the ease of quantifiability. 
--How does the growth of professional standards and governmental regulations effect* 
internal accounting practices? The process of adopting new managerial practices results from a 
variety of forces including, but not restricted to, attempts to control costs and rationalize decision 
making (Zald, 1987). 
Fligstein (1987) provides evidence that over time personnel with a background in finance 
became more likely to head the largest corporations from the beginning to the end of the 1919- 
1979 period. He shows that a s  a proportion of the total entrepreneurs and those out of 
manufacturing backgrounds declined over the time span. To some extent, the switch is related to 
corporate strategy. At the beginning of the period the largest firms were often single product 
firms with a unitary functional structure. They were likely to be headed by entrepreneurs or 
managers out of a manufacturing background. Firms with a conglomerate and product-related 
strategy were more likely to have executives with a finance background, and those kinds of firms 
were more likely to be among the largest firms in the recent period. Again comparative studies of 
top personnel in industries in different countries would be well worth carrying out. 
--Is there a constellation of management rationalization, including cost accounting, 
organization of the production process, and labor organization and labor relations that go together 
in the development of industries? Chandler does not devote much attention to labor relations and 
the actual management of production. For each of his exemplar companies, it would be 
fascinating to examine the status of their labor relations and the detailed nature of their internal 
management and organization of production processes. Piore and Sabel (1985; see also Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 1985) argue that  management practice is closely bundled with production technology and 
labor organization. However, these differences may show more in national differences than in 
company to company variation, since management theories are part  of national institutionalized 
ideologies. (See also below.) 
We have known for sometime (Bendix, 1955) that  national ideology and social structure 
shaped managerial ideology. The historical and comparative thrust of this section suggests that  
even the most technically developed components of managerial practice, such a s  accounting rules, 
have a similar social embeddedness. 
The Organization of Labor on the Shop Floor. Somewhat separately from mainstream 
organizational theory, there has been a torrent of studies of the organization of production as a 
labor process. Motivated by social history, by Marxist concerns about history from the bottom up, 
and by a desire to understand the actual social relations of production, many of these studies 
examine the interplay of technology, worker organization, capital and management and the larger, 
state institutions surrounding production. The studies are both contemporaneous and historical. 
Some of these studies (Clawson, 1980; Stone, 1985) argue that  the bureaucratization of the 
employment relation was a s  much a technique of management control a s  i t  was a mechanism for 
raising profits. Clawson actually goes further--he believes and provides some evidence that  the 
substitution of direct employment for sub-contracting, the earlier form of hiring labor, was done 
more for management control than for its contribution to profit making. Richard Edwards (1979) -
examined the transformatioli and bureaucratization of labor relations as  we moved from 
personalism and personal domination, to technical, and finally to bureaucratic and human 
relations models of organizational control. 
Harry Braverman's (1974) important work raised the deskilling argument to center stage. 
Braverman argued that the long range trend in American industry was for craft-based jobs to be 
replaced by semi-skilled and low-skilled job requirements. However, the weight of the evidence is 
that deskilling may occur in some industries, but hardly occurs in all. Granovetter and Tilly's 
(1987) careful evaluation suggests that, if anything, skill requirements, complexity and the 
handling of non-routine tasks may have increased in the overall work force. Moreover, the 
amount of deskilling is not a direct function of the amount of automation and technological 
substitution, as  in Braverman's account, but a complex outcome of bargaining power of workers 
and managers, the state of the economy, rates of technical change which raise workers control of 
tacit knowledge, and other factors. 
Indeed, new studies might take into account the role of labor and labor unions in creating 
. deskilling a t  earlier times, as they contested with management for the definition of jobs on the 
work floor. Unions wanted precise job categories and inflexible assignment schedules as a defense 
against management. Deskilling may have been the result. In the current era, as  international 
competition heats up, management is pressuring for job assignment flexiblity, increasing the 
number of tasks workers must master. Zimbalist's (1979) important compilation of case studies 
provides a good cross-section of the organization of production and labor relations in different 
industries. 
Most of the literature attributes the transformation of the social relations of production to 
the interaction of technological change, labor solidarity or lack thereof (including the impact of 
unionization on both unionized and non-unionized companies) and management rationalization. 
At least a s  important was the enactment of legislation governing employment relations. Laws 
such as the wages and hours act, or more recently, legislation on the requirements for vesting 
pensions, are major forces for standardizing the terms of employment relations. Baron, e t  al. 
(1986) have shown how the transformation of personnel practices were facilitated by state 
action,especially during war time. Sanford Jacoby (1985) examines the growth of personnel 
departments as  an aspect of the bureaucratization of labor relations. Jacoby examines how the 
"demand drive" system, treating labor as a pure commodity dominated by strong foremen, was 
transformed. On the one hand, reformers within management argued that the demand drive 
system was inhuman and unproductive. Social workers, ex-socialists and other labor missionaries 
came into management to transform the system; a professional social movement, if you will. 
Simultaneously shifts in the economy promoted bureaucratization. As labor productivity declined 
in World War I--labor was scarce and quit rates were high--the government pressured shipyards 
and other military equipment providers to adopt labor practices, rules, standard days, and so on, 
that would hold labor and generate higher productivity. The state played a major role in 
promoting the program of the emerging profession of personnel administrators again during the 
Great Depression. 
I t  is possible to combine the historical evolution of management of labor force, ala 
Edwards, with the more cross sectional analysis represented in Zimbalist. That is, the 
organization of production in an industry is not only a function of the actual task-technology 
demands, but of broader societal institutions of labor relations and management training. 
Moreover, we now have sophisticated notions of internal labor markets that examine how large 
organizations structure careers within and between organizations, substituting for or 
complementing market exchange models. 
This suggests both an empirical and a theoretical agenda. Historical studies of internal 
labor markets are in order. To the extent that personnel files can be retrieved or reconstructed, 
and to the extent that we have a knowledge of a firm's organizational structure, it becomes 
possible to reconstruct the evolution of a firm's internal labor market over time. Such research 
becomes part of a disaggregated approach to the study of social mobility and the transformation of 
stratification in emerging industrial society. 
Two theoretical tasks are suggested. Hou: do internal labor markets tie to the organization 
of production across industries? How do internal labor markets tie to social mobility and 
stratification? There are hints in the literature about how one would pursue such issues. With 
regard to the cross-industry generation of internal labor markets, they inust be treated a s  a joint 
product of production process, labor-management systems, and state intervention. Internal labor 
markets tie to social mobility and stratification through the reification of job categories, career and 
job.qualifications and reward systems. (See Stewman, 1986 and Rosenbaum, 1984.) These are 
extremely important topics for historical understanding and for the development of linkages 
between stratification theory and organizational theory. 
These kinds of studies also tie to a number of policy and institutional choice issues. 
Internal labor markets and the organizational structuring of labor relations have deep implications 
for the productivity of firms and the career opportunities of minorities and women. Shop floor 
organization fascinates scholars, and also has important policy implications. 
Enterprise Form and Structural Options. A discussion of managerial control and of the 
organization of work as  historically nested processes focuses on micro processes even as  i t  draws 
on larger cultural, political and institutional processes. A consideration of enterprise form issues 
turns us to the law and the structured processes for mobilizing and allocating capital. Micro- 
issues do not disappear, but macro issues of legal change and political process come to center 
stage. 
Enterprise form deals with the legal constitution of organizations and the assignment and 
disposal of property and property rights. As noted earlier, common language enterprise forms 
include sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited partnerships, private corporations, publicly 
owned or listed corporations, state owned corporations, public organizations (government 
agencies), associations, church organizations, etcetera. Each enterprise form has a legal history, 
more or less complicated, that  details how the terms of ownership, management, capital 
mobilization, and capital dispersal, will take place. Moreover, each enterprise form actually 
constitutes a complex of rules and laws shaped by standard setting bodies, such as the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Internal Revenue 
Service. 
These terms of ownership may favor one group or another. To use a n  example much in 
the news in 1986 and 1987, if the incumbent board of directors of a corporation is legally allowed 
to stagger the terms of board members, new owners of the stock of the corporation are limited in 
their ability to dispose of and manage a corporation. Such rules a re  "poison pill" rules, legally 
enforceable and part  of the enterprise rules of corporations. They are a defense against hostile 
takeovers. 
Enterprise forms are different ways of packaging property rights to achieve individual and 
social ends. The adoption of enterprise forms in broad stroke (major form) and in fine grain 
(specific rule constellation) are subject to an  historically nested political economy of choice. 
That  is, the use of a particular enterprise form depends upon the perceived costs and 
benefits of its use in comparison with other available enterprise forms. Whether to structure a 
hospital a s  a for-profit corporation or  as a not-for-profit eleemosynary organization responds to 
changes in the availability of money in capital markets and changes in management and hospital 
technolog. Transforming a publicly listed corporation into a private one is partly a function of 
capital availability and the possibility of shielding property control from takeover bids. Moving 
from corporate form to partnership form becomes desirable, if tax rates are much lower for 
partnerships. 
Scholars writing about enterprise form in capitalist societies tend to write as if the modern 
American corporation was somehow inevitable. They write as if the general purpose (unrestricted 
charter) corporation, that  limited the liabilty of owners and treated the corporation as  a person, 
had an  evolutionary dominance over other forms. Legal scholars, such as  Lawrence Friedman 
(1976) noted how American states desiring to encourage economic development rushed to free 
capital of restrictive charters and personal liability. And Chandler treated the corporate form as  
part and parcel of the modern firm. 
This gloss ignores the historical alternatives. In particular, trusts and combinations a s  
enterprise forms were outlawed, limiting the role of investment banks as controlling entities in the 
ongoing operation of goods producing and distributing firms. Cartels were actually encouraged by 
law in Germany until after World War I1 and Japanese Trading companies had banks a t  their 
core. (For the contrast of European and American developments see Cornish, in Horn and Kocka, 
1979.) Stock markets became important earlier in the United States than in other countries, 
because alternative vehicles for capital investment had been narrowed. The absence of a national 
bank and limits on bank ownership of corporations forced corporations into the stock market a s  a 
source of investment. The success of the American corporate form and American political and 
economic hegemony following World War I1 suggested to other nations alternatives for the relation 
of banks to industry. The growth of the multiple division (M-form) firm, with corporate 
headquarters acting as  an investment bank in relation to its decentralized divisions, was a t  least 
in part  a function of American anti-trust law which limited banks in the direct control of 
corporations, and tax law, which levied lower rates on corporations than on individuals and which 
permitted retained earnings to be used in the business. 
The joint effects of tax law and anti-trust policy are  not well understood, but Neil Fligstein 
(forthcoming) has shown how changing anti-trust policy has  reshaped the combinatorial 
possibilities for large corporations. First, the trusts were outlawed, which eliminated industry 
cartels dominated by banks and opened up the possibility of vertical and horizontal integration as 
a manufacturing strategy. 
Later, the Cellar-Kefauver Act closed off the possibilities of these two forms of merger. 
The conglomerate form, combining divisions with unrelated products became the option for 
executives with extended credit lines and the ability to see the stock market potentials of large 
conglomerates. Fligstein also shows how regulatory policy limited entry and stabilized industries 
and firms that  otherwise might have declined in size and profitability. 
We do not have a well developed sociology of enterprise form, a t  this point, but one can 
begin to discern its outline. First, what are the stakes for political officeholders in creating and 
legitimating alternative enterprise forms? Andrew Creighton (1987) argues that  in the 
Jacksonian period the corporation was feared as  a monopoly holder. Created by the state for 
limited public ends, early corporations gave monopology rights to businessmen to achieve public 
ends. Only later in the nineteenth century did legislators and judges in America rush to free 
capital. Both ideological and political economy motives were involved. To use a current example 
from the Soviet Union, Gorbachev hesitantly embraces limited private property forms--ideology 
clashes with political economy reality. Enterprise forms are legally embedded. State action is 
required and we must study the political process involved in creating and sustaining enterprise 
forms. 
Second, the choice of enterprise form and which form comes to dominate has consequences 
for the rise and fall of class fragments, for the fine grained texture of class cohesion and class 
action. William Roy (1986) demonstrates how the transformation of the mechanisms for 
accumulating capital, the growth of banks, and the emergence of different kinds of investment 
media, changed the structure of capital accumulation, investment, and the dominance of class 
fragments in America. Landed gentry and merchant capital gave way to the new corporate 
entrepreneurs. His tale, which is an historically contingent analysis of the interplay of the state, 
classes, and capitalism, gives a very different picture of the emergence of the modern corporation 
than does Chandler. 
Current events make the general point vivid. The hostile takeover movement of the 1980s 
pits fragments of capital against each other; the outsiders using speculative money and new 
investment media (junk bonds) against established and entrenched management. The center of 
much of the action switches to law offices and investment banks. The white hats and the black 
hats are all within the capitalist class, though they vary in ethnicity, networks and social 
legitimacy. 
The Transformation of Organizational Environments. One of the staples of organizational 
analysis is the study of organizational environments and inter-organizational relations. Inter- 
organizational relations include conflictual, competitive and cooperative relations. The analysis of 
organizational environments is more general than the study of inter-organizational relations and 
often involves an attempt to characterize the overall stability, dynamics and turbulence of the 
environment in which organizations exist (Emery and Trist, 1965). 
As a general proposition students of organizations believe that the environments of 
organizations, and especially business organizations, are more turbulent today than during earlier 
times. Similarly, it is probably fair to say that there are a greater number and variety of inter- 
organizational relations and forms for these relations than existed earlier. However, these broad 
propositions lack historical specificity. Giving them some historical specificity entails attaching 
them to the changing political economy and to the transformed possibilities made available 
through institutionalized repertoires of action. Both are large topics, but I can discuss the 
directions that analysis might take. 
Emery and Trist characterized environments in terms of two dimensions, the degree of 
clustering (or power concentration) of environmental elements in contact with an organization 
(e.g., buyers, suppliers, government agencies, etc.) and the rate of change of relevant aspects of 
elements of the environment (e.g., technological and product characteristics, labor force supply, 
new elements coming and going). A turbulent environment is one in which there is a high rate of 
change in the elements and a great deal of clustering of the elements. An orgenization in a field 
with powerful unions, great governmental involvement and rapid levels of techological and product 
change would be said to be in a turbulent field. 
Although the general proposition of increasing turbulence may well hold, it is likely that 
different industries are on different trajectories. As Tushman and Romanelli (1985) argue, 
industries evolve a t  different rates and go through periods of stability and instability at  different 
times, which reshape industry structure, the exit and entry rates of organizations, and the 
adaptive structure of firms. Indeed, it may well be that a s  the political economy changes, some 
industries become less turbulent; there is a declustering of elements and/or a slowing down of 
rates of change. For instance, increased international competition has contributed to declining 
unionism and declining power of those unions that continue to represent workers, a t  least in those 
industries directly tied to international markets. If turbulence is related to concentration of 
elements, the decline of unions and union strength leads to a decline in turbulence. Similarly, the 
conservative swing of many Western governments has led them to preach deregulation and lower 
intervention in industry affairs. (Of course, whether there has actually been a decline in 
intervention is an empirical matter.) 
On the other hand, even though the clustering of power elements may have declined in 
some industries, rates of change in elements may have increased. Both the auto industry and the 
airlines face higher rates of change a t  the same time that elements are less clustered. From a 
managerial point of view, I suspect that the environment looks more threatening and unstable, 
even while labor and government are "off their back." 
Not only must organizational environments be analysed in specific political economies, 
they must be connected to the changing repertoire of institutionalized forms. In an organizational 
and professional society, an engine exists to create new forms and possibilities for packaging 
organized action. As management schools have flourished, a s  the courts and government have 
permitted a wider range of inter-organizational relations, and as  managers and professionals have 
made choice of organizational form and attachment a rational act, rather than a traditional 
expectation, new repertoires of action are entertained. 
There has been an explosion of governance forms. Franchise chains, long term contracts, 
and arbitrational institutions have flourished. Theoretical work has begun to catch up with the 
empirical reality (Macaulay, 1963; Stinchcombe, 1985; Williamson, 1985). But the history and 
description of the transformation has not been attempted. Stinchcombe titles his paper "Contracts 
as  Hierarchical Documents." The image is appropos and begins to change our view of the 
structured relations of the economy. Long term contracts are an alternative to joint ventures or 
vertical integration. As managers contemplate the choice of organizational structure, what is 
inside or outside of the organization becomes a matter of choice. For instance, many hospitals 
now purchase custodial services from independent contractors, rather than employing custodial 
personnel directly. Although the automobile industry in America has long had long term 
relationships with suppliers, international competition has led them to reconsider their out- 
sourcing of parts manufacture a t  the same time that it has created new joint ventures with a 
variety of competitors and suppliers. Similarly, strategic managerial services are sometimes hired 
on a part-time and even temporary basis, rather than provided by full-time permanent personnel 
(Baron and Pfeffer, 1986). Of course, these new institutionalized forms are not used equally in all 
parts of the economy. 
If, in fact, there have been increasing rates of change in many industries and if more 
aspects of inter-organizational relations are a matter of managerial choice rather than traditional 
. . : . .givens, then we might expect to find a change in job of top managers. More Chief Executives will 
. . find themselves managing inter-organizational coalitions. and alliances, and their role a s  internal 
managers will be handed over to others. Sooner or later, we would expect to find a transformation 
in their training and selection, much as.we found a move to the selection of financial officers in 
earlier times. 
The Growth of the Positive State and the Organizational Society 
Much of organizational theory is written as if the state does not exist, or the state is 
treated as  part of the environmental context of organizations. We noted earlier that legislative 
and judicial enactments created the enterprise form of the general purpose, limited liability public 
corporation. What needs more attention is the history and sociology of the state as  an 
administrative-organizational entity in its own right. How did the state change its administrative 
capacities? How did that transformation of the state impinge upon and create the conditions for 
an organizational society? One approach is to ask how the state creates the conditions for stable 
exchange relations over large populations. The rationalization of law, the creation of stable and 
universally accepted currency are state functions promoting larger markets. Even within this 
. perspective, the state has further functions. 
The role of Herbert Hoover in creating the conditions for an expanded and state facilitated 
economy, through governmental standardization and cooperation is well known to students of the 
period (Arnold, 1982). The modern state system works beyond national boundaries, of course. 
The globalization of industry is dependent on compacts and laws between nations that leads to 
, enforceable contracts and the regular movement of goods and services. 
I 
The modern state goes way beyond merely providing the context for large organizations, 
however. I t  provides infra-structural resources without which it is hardly possible to imagine 
organizations existing. Everything from public transportation systems to education systems that  
generate a pool of skilled and literate labor a re  dependent upon the state. Moreover, state policy 
with regards to health, safety, welfare, capital exchange, and taxation deeply penetrates 
organizations. Although organizational theory often does not remark on this deep penetration, 
students of political economy, Marxist or otherwise, do (cf. O'Connor, 1973; Shonfield, 1969). 
How might the historical development of state structures be linked to the study of 
organizations? In fact, there are several facets to the problem. Let me suggest three--the 
development of administrative capacity, national ideology and the legitimation of enterprise form, 
and jurisdictional geography. 
Administrative capacity deals with the ability of state agencies to cope with the problems 
of delivering public goods in a systematic way. Consider a homey example: could a postal service 
made up of part-time political appointees be expected to.fine tune a mail service over a population 
of two hundred forty million people, coordinating the transportation of millions of pieces of mail? 
What kind of administrative apparatus is needed for securing public health? What is the 
administative apparatus necessary for controlling government bureaucrats in a large Democratic 
State? 
Stephen Skowronek (1984) has  begun to elaborate the administrative procedures, 
professional training grounds, and organizational capacities that  went into the transformation of 
the American federal government as  a n  administrative-effective organization. In  the American 
case, Skowronek argues tha t  we were a nation of legislatures and courts, opposed to and without 
legitimation of executive and central administrative action. Martin Shefter (1977) has argued that  
the strength of administrative organizations interacts with the emergence of mass suffrage to 
shape the nature of political parties in Western Democracies. Where administration was strong 
and could deliver services, political parties became more policy- and ideologically- oriented. Where 
administration was weak, as in the United States, parties became vehicles for the delivery of 
patronage and pork barrel demands. Between nations, we would expect that the relative strength 
and legitimation of state administrative action a t  earlier points in time affect the ability of the 
state to effectively coordinate policy implementation, once the decisions to implement policy have 
been taken. 
A second historical issue has to do with how state ideology has justified a variety of 
enterprise forms and how these have changed over time. Because we live in a state that allows 
and indeed encourages a variety of enterprise forms, we tend to forget how exceptional that state 
is. The size of the non-profit sector, the encouragement of public corporations, the extent of 
voluntary associations, and the amount of government ownership of manufacturing and other 
organizations vary widely among modern nations. There are cycles or  promotion or constraint of 
these forms, and the turning points in these cycles may be hotly contested and politicized. 
Frederick Pryor (1973) has discussed the variation among nations in the extent to which 
industries are likely to be in the public domain, to be regulated, or to be left relatively free of 
government ownership. For instance, even in socialist societies restaurants may be profit making, 
on the other hand, banking is either government owned or regulated in almost all societies. Ralph 
Kramer (1982) has documented national differences in the size of the not-for-profit sector. Garner 
and Zald (1985) have discussed the extent to which societies actively and passively encourage the 
social movement sector. Passive encouragement comes about through general tax laws, media 
access, and policy structures that do or do not hinder group mobilization. Active encouragement 
or discouragement occurs through the specific allocation of constraint or opportunities to specific 
social movements. The general trend, with many exceptions, is for western societies to loosen the 
reins on social movements. 
Finally, the structure of state jurisdictions, the level of centralization or decentralization, 
and the parceling out of responsibilities among functional agencies shape the political matrix in 
which industries and organizations exist. These jurisdictions may change over time. For instance, 
as the Federal government becomes a large element in the construction industry, federal policy 
affects the fate of labor and companies alike. As the Federal government does or does not get 
involved in education a t  various levels, the extent to which educators and their professional 
associations turn to Washington or to state capitals will change (Zald, Jacobs, and Useem, 1987). 
Once we have a sense of how the positive state has grown and changed in its relations to 
organizations, we must return to the topic of how the state and organization interact, how they 
reach out towards each other. Phillipe Schmitter and his colleagues (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 
1979; Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) have discussed private interest intermediation and concepts 
such a s  corporatism as  a way to get a t  these questions. Understanding the intersection of 
organizations and the state is facilitated by examining organizations as part  of industries. 
Industry life cycles, industry structure and the position of organizations within industries affect 
the ability of industries to mobilize and make demands upon the state and the issues which 
concern them. Often the state's interest in particular organizations is often related to the industry 
in which it sits (Zald, Jacobs, and Useem, 1987). These are large, difficult, and important issues. 
Conclusions 
This paper begins from a large programmatic and meta-theoretical premise--that the 
isolation of organizational theory from historical context and analysis impedes the progress of 
organizational studies. It  leads to over-generalization, ignoring historical alternatives, and 
misspecification of causation. Although I have argued that history and theory must be joined in 
the study of organizations, exactly how we are to do that is not perfectly clear. There are many 
alternatives, including the historical examination of particular types of organizations, the 
development of uniquely historical theories about specific features of organizations, and so on (see 
the appendix). 
The strategy chosen here has been to identify a range of issues of concern to sociologists of 
organization, especially but not exclusively, sociologists that deal with large corporations. These 
topics--management control systems, labor process, enterprise form and rules, environmental 
turbulence, and state action are often treated synchronically with little attention to historical 
development, or they are treated a s  if there is one large master trend. My tack has been to ask 
how historical and comparative analyses might illuminate our understanding of the trend or of the 
processes underlying a given concept. Sources of variation are found in institutional history, 
political arrangements, social inventions, and historical conjunction. No singular organizational 
theory will do, and abstract concepts from economics, sociology, and political science will be 
, , invoked as-they are needed. 
I began this paper with a.lament: from the point of view of the sociology of organizations, 
we are in danger of developing abstract theory unconnected to historical context. On the other 
hand, the paper also offers an implicit challenge to historians of business and organizations; to the 
extent that they proceed without explicit theory or concepts, they stand in danger of getting 
trapped in the cultural understandings of the day, of assuming social forms and historical 
progression. If so, historians of organization and sociologists of organization need each other-- 
badly. The approach I have taken is one among many that might be followed. But there are 
many other modes of breaching the wall. As one thinks about different solutions and different 
examples one must try and avoid opposing pitfalls--the poverty of historicism and the emptiness of 
abstract generalizations. 
My analysis also suggests an approach to institutional choice that blends historical, 
sociological and rational choice models. Proposals for change a t  the micro level of the firm or the 
macro level of the political economy presume goals and maximization of values. Inevitably any 
proposal for change, whether of enterprise form or of labor relations, addresses itself largely to the 
problem a t  hand, within the current frame of debate. However, institutional choice is constrained 
by the dominant hand of past choice as manifested in embedded practice and by ideological 
assumptions often unconsciously rendered. The historical and comparative approach suggested 
here might help to explore a wider range of alternatives at the same time that it weighed in 
against naive borrowing or grafting of those alternatives. 
APPENDIX 
An Excursus on History and Organizations 
A large methodological issue is how one goes about combining history, theory and the 
study of organizations. Since there are alternative approaches and meanings for each of those 
terms, a systematic discussion is well beyond the reach of this paper. A brief discussion will a t  
least highlight the possibilities. History is the expression, discussion, and interpretation of events 
that  occur in a time dependent sequence. Sometimes defined a s  a narrative of events over time, 
history usually deals with some change in the object under study over a time period. If the period 
is described in a synchronic or static fashion, it is usually assumed (at  least implicitly) that  the 
c .  period studied differs from the period before or after in some significant regard. 
; A History-for-itself approach to organizations would treat organizational matters without  
reference to theoretical issues generated by the nomothetic social sciences. Historical studies 
would then be of value to the extent that  scholars and others were interested in knowing the 
history of particular organizations, e.g. Ford Motor, or of particular components of organizations, 
e.g. the history of personnel departments in American corporations. Those histories might or 
might not fit into our larger understandings. Pure history-for-itself is important a s  it helps us  to 
understand how a particular organization was transformed. 
On the other hand, history-for-itself speaks to more generalizing concerns if the cases 
selected are believed to bear on more abstract concerns. For instance, a s  one of the first large 
mass production manufacturing organizations, Ford Motor Company "stands for" the emergence 
of mass production. The emergence and growth of personnel departments can be considered part 
of the bureaucratization of labor relations and, thus, histories of them help us understand that  
general process of bureaucratization (Jacoby, 1985). To the extent that  the historian studies a 
particular organization because i t  "stands for" or is "part of '  a larger process, some implicit or 
explicit larger generalization is being invoked. The narrative for itself is no longer the goal. 
A second use of the history of organizations would be as a testing grounds for nomothetic 
propositions. Here the history of a single organization or of a sample of organizations is used to 
test hypotheses that  predict differences in organizations as  they experience different events and 
system states. Chandler's thesis (1962) that  strategy causes structure was "proved" by 
examining the history of American corporations that  were early adopters of divisional 
decentralization. Chandler argued that  as company strategy led them into-different product lines 
and manufacturing processes, i t  became more and more difficult for a functional departmental 
structure (with separate unitary marketing and manufacturing departments) to cope quickly and 
wisely with the complexity of operation. A structural change to a multiple divisional system was 
adopted. Similarly, Williamson (1975) used Chandler's data to argue for his own theory based on 
transaction cost advantages to explain which corporations would or would not adopt divisional 
. decentralization. 
A weaker version. of this "testing grounds" approach is found in Zald's study (1970) of the 
Young Men's Christian Association. That study uses the history of the YMCA in the United 
States and in Chicago to illustrate the application of a political-economy approach to the analysis 
of organizations. Selznick's classic study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (1949) also uses 
history as illustrative ground for a theory. These are weaker approaches to the use of history 
because the possibility for disproof of specific propositions and predictions is hard to imagine. 
Instead, the theories or theoretical frames are found to be "useful" in explaining the historical 
events. 
A third approach would be to develop historical theories of organizations. Historical 
theories make time dependent events or processes critical to explaining later states and events of 
organizations. They may be of several forms. Stinchcombe (1965), in a now classic paper, argued 
that  the occupational mix and processes in an  industry were very much dependent upon the 
knowledge of how to do things tha t  was available when the industry was founded. This might be 
called the impact of foundations hypothesis. Another approach of historical theories would be to 
argue that  if X occurs a t  T I ,  Y occurs a t  T2. Although not dealing with organizations, Barrington 
Moore's (1966) argument about the relationship of class coalitions among landed aristocracy, 
peasants, urban workers and bourgeoisie a t  the beginning of industrialization to the development 
of democracy, fascism or communism is of this order. 
Another historical theory would be one that  postulated a conjunctural approach to 
organizational development. Here the occurrence of several events or processes together pushes 
organizations in one direction, while the occurence of these same processes at different time points 
might lead in a different direction. Theda Skocpol's (1979) structural theory of revolutions, which 
postulates that  successful revolutions require both exacerbated social conflict - and a weak and 
discredited regime, is a conjunctural theory. 
A final approach, and the one employed here, is tha t  of historical specification of core 
components. Historical process and societal differences a re  used to explain options that  underlie 
the large transformations in particular kinds of organizations. Instead of assuming that  the 
current shape of organizations has some kind of inevitability, historical data are used to 
understand the particular shape of the components of the organizational type being studied. It 
combines a soft kind of conjunctural analysis and explicit generalizations about the important 
transformations of organizations in society. 
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